Fictional Documentaries and Truthful Fictions: The Death Penalty in Recent American Film by Dow, David R.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2000
Fictional Documentaries and Truthful Fictions:
The Death Penalty in Recent American Film
David R. Dow
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dow, David R., "Fictional Documentaries and Truthful Fictions: The Death Penalty in Recent American Film" (2000). Constitutional
Commentary. 247.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/247
FICTIONAL DOCUMENTARIES AND 
TRUTHFUL FICTIONS: THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN RECENT AMERICAN FILM 
David R. Dow* 
When it comes to death, most Hollywood movies cheat. 
They cheat by tinkering with the truth, because the truth as it ac-
tually is is too complex or too disturbing to confront honestly. 
(The so-called happy ending is the most famous form of such 
cheating.) They cheat because people generally prefer happi-
ness and simplicity to darkness and complexity, especially where 
their entertainment is concerned, and filmmakers tend to give 
people what they want. 
Even great movies cheat. For example, last year's Oscar 
winner for best picture, American Beauty, cheats egregiously. 
The movie (for the one or two of you who have not seen it) deals 
with modern times: It is about suburbia, men and women who 
mindlessly pursue meaningless careers, bigotry, and finally, hope 
and redemption. In the end, the character played by Kevin 
Spacey is murdered. This is not a surprise ending because the 
Spacey character narrates the movie in a voice-over, and he tells 
us as the movie opens that in less than a year he will no longer 
be alive. We know at the beginning that 110 minutes later Kevin 
Spacey's character will be dead. 
Spacey plays a morally ambiguous character. He is in the 
midst of a full-blown mid-life crisis. He is a lousy husband and a 
worse father. For virtually the entire length of the film, he lusts 
after his daughter's high school classmate. In the end, however, 
he gently rebuffs a neighbor's homosexual advance and-again 
* George Butler Research Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. 
I am grateful to the Butler Foundation and the University of Houston Law Foundation, 
both of which provided financial support for the writing of this essay. I also appreciated 
the opportunity to present a version of this paper in New Orleans at the annual joint 
meeting of the American Culture Association and Popular Culture Association. Finally, 
I am thankful to Suzanna Sherry and Mark Dow for reading and commenting on earlier 
versions of this essay. 
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gently-declines to have intercourse with the high school cheer-
leader who is lying pants-less on his couch. The message here is 
not subtle: Spacey redeems himself, in this movie about figura-
tive death and spiritual renewal, and just as he does so, he gets 
shot. 
This bloody ending would be at least a little depressing-
except that the Spacey character is still talking; he continues the 
narrative voice-over even after his brains have been blown out 
and blood is pouring from his head. We see him lifeless but can 
believe that he is not dead because we hear him still full of life. 
Through this narrative technique, Spacey stays alive despite hav-
ing been murdered. He even tells us what it is like to be dead, 
and thereby blunts the tragedy of his death. In science fiction or 
fantasy, dead people can keep talking, but in a realist film-and 
this movie's power is its stark realism; there may not be an un-
true or unreal sentence in the entire script-narration from a 
dead man is cheating. 
Death penalty movies cheat as well. Unlike American 
Beauty, they cannot cheat by having an execution victim remain 
alive (although The Green Mile, which I discuss below, comes 
close to this mode of cheating). Instead, they cheat by featuring 
an innocent inmate: someone who, by nearly anyone's estima-
tion, deserves to be living. This focus is their mode of distrac-
tion, their mode of avoiding moral complexity. Death penalty 
movies that focus on innocence cheat because they allow the 
viewer to be certain that the protagonist ought not to be killed; 
such movies permit viewers to oppose a death penalty without 
opposing the death penalty. In real life, we do not have that in-
dulgence. 
When death penalty movies cheat, they obscure the funda-
mental moral questions that the death penalty involves. One 
might expect documentaries to be more real and Hollywood 
productions to be less so, but one would be wrong. Exactly the 
opposite is true. Documentaries cheat much more than Holly-
wood movies. Most (though not all) documentaries cheat by fo-
cusing almost exclusively on the issue of innocence, whereas 
many Hollywood movies willingly grapple with moral complex-
ity by featuring at least one guilty inmate. 1 Moreover, although 
I. There are notable exceptions to my thesis. In particular, many Hollywood mov-
ies, including To Kill a Mockingbird, True Crime, and The Chamber, cheat in the same 
way I am critical of in this essay: by focusing entirely on innocence. On the other hand, I 
Want to Live and Last Dance, also Hollywood productions, do not cheat, nor does the 
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the focus on innocence might seem innocuous, it is in fact rather 
pernicious, because it contributes to the increasingly widespread 
view that there is no great harm in violating a person's rights as 
long as we are certain that the person is guilty. 
My thesis, then, is that fiction is more true than nonfiction, 
and I will illustrate this thesis by examining four principal films, 
two documentaries and two Hollywood movies. The documen-
taries are The Thin Blue Line (TBL), which deals with a former 
inmate of death row in Texas named Randall Dale Adams, and 
Fourteen Days in May (FDM), which deals with a former inmate 
of death row in Mississippi named Edward Earl Johnson. Ad-
ams was released; Johnson was executed. The two Hollywood 
films are Dead Man Walking (DMW) and The Green Mile 
(TGM). Both involve fictional murderers, and both are set on 
Louisiana's death row. DMW, though based on a work of non-
fiction/ is itself fiction; it centers around an inmate of death row 
who is a composite of multiple murderers rather than a single 
accused. TGM is based on a work by Stephen King,3 so it should 
come as no surprise that the film combines realism with super-
naturalism, and it is therefore an achievement of heroic propor-
tions that this film does not cheat. 
The ironies implicit in my argument are numerous and 
multi-dimensional. Thus, The Thin Blue Line is a movie that 
cheats because it is the story of an inmate wrongfully accused, 
yet it literally resulted in the saving of an innocent man's life. 
Dead Man Walking does not cheat in the slightest, but whether it 
affects the real world to even the slightest degree is open to 
question. Fourteen Days in May cheats by suggesting that the 
executed inmate is innocent, but without letting us see the sup-
posedly exculpatory witness. The Green Mile shows the execu-
tion of someone we know is innocent, yet it also shows two other 
executions where the guilt of the inmate is not in question, as 
well as showing a particularly hateful criminal get murdered in 
prison. In this sense, TGM simultaneously provokes in the 
viewers discomfort with the death penalty (we see nonviolent as 
documentary The Execwion Protocol, which addresses the death penalty in Missouri. I 
do not discuss British films, including 10 Rillington Place and Ler Him Have Ir, the for-
mer of which focuses on innocence and the latter of which focuses on youth and mental 
retardation. · 
2. Helen Prejean. Dead Man \\'a/king: An Eye~>·irness Accowll of rhe Dearh Pen-
airy in rhe Unired Srares (Vintage Books. 1994 ). 
3. The sixth and final part of the serial novel The Green Mile was published in 
1996 
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well as innocent men get electrocuted) and also satisfaction 
when we see a vile criminal suddenly shot. This very conflict is 
as common as it is inexplicable, and TGM is the only one of the 
films to evoke it. In short, the documentaries are false and the 
fiction is true. 
This essay consists of two major sections. In Part I, I ad-
dress the death penalty regime in America. The discussion com-
bines a summary of recent research as well as anecdotal evidence 
based on my own experience of representing death row inmates. 
In Part II, I turn to the films and argue that, although death pen-
alty documentaries are fine and gripping films, the Hollywood 
productions do a far better job of illuminating the entirety of the 
death penalty world. The documentaries, like the popular media 
in the United States, exemplify a transfixion with the problem of 
executing an innocent man. To be sure, the execution of an in-
nocent man represents the quintessential failure of the justice 
system; nevertheless, the fact that there are innocent men on 
death row is a symptom of far more widespread problems, such 
as ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate appellate re-
view. The Hollywood films, though fiction, do a far better job at 
communicating this basic truth. 
I. THEORY AND PRACTICE 
There are two reasons one might oppose the death penalty. 
One reason is that it is wrong for the state to kill; the other is 
that although it is in theory acceptable for the state to execute, it 
is wrong in practice. The first of these reasons is absolute and 
categorical; the second is conditional. 
Similarly, just as there are both conditional and categorical 
bases for opposing capital punishment, there are both condi-
tional and categorical bases for favoring it. The categorical ar-
gument is typically referred to as retribution; the conditional ar-
guments are grounded in utilitarian considerations. In fact, the 
utilitarian argument can take several forms, including general 
deterrence, specific deterrence, even eugenics. In any case, be-
cause the validity of the utilitarian argument depends on empiri-
cal data, it can be disproved, and someone who supports the 
death penalty solely on the grounds of utilitarianism might 
change his or her mind, in view of the data. On the other hand, 
the retributive impulse is simply that: an impulse, a feeling, an 
urge one has. The retributive rationale is a moral position that 
does not depend for its justification on any fact of the matter. 
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One who supports the death penalty for reasons of retribution 
essentially maintains that vengeance is a legitimate basis for 
state action. 
Thus, because both the pro- and anti- forces have available 
to them both absolute and conditional forms of argument, the 
debate concerning the death penalty can take place at either a 
theoretical or a practical level. I therefore want to stress that my 
thesis is not that documentaries are practical while Hollywood 
films are theoretical (or vice versa). My argument, instead, is 
that documentaries are not simply practical, they are mislead-
ingly and narrowly so. The problem of executing innocent men4 
is a practical issue, rather than a purely theoretical one, but it is 
only one of a myriad of practical issues, and it is more properly 
understood as a symptom of a larger problem rather than as a 
problem in itself. This point is apprehended by the Hollywood 
films, though not by the documentaries. The Hollywood movies, 
moreover, illustrate a much greater willingness to grapple with 
the theoretical issues, issues that the documentaries studiously 
eschew. 
A. THEORY 
Camus once said that the only serious philosophical ques-
tion is the question of suicide. In death penalty cases, the only 
serious question is homicide: whether the state ought to engage 
in it. Every other issue is just a distraction. 
I have on my desk a death certificate for a man I repre-
sented. There is a space on the certificate where the physician 
who declared my client dead was required to indicate the cause 
of death. The cause of death is listed as homicide. Unlike the 
word murder, which is a technical legal term of art, the word 
homicide is simply the sum of its parts: homi from homo, mean-
ing man; cide from cidere, meaning to kill or slay. What a mur-
derer does when he murders is commit homicide; what the state 
does when it executes is commit homicide. Both are killing. The 
theoretical issue presented by the death penalty is whether the 
state ought to commit homicide. 
Death penalty movies cheat when they substitute the ques-
tion "Is it permissible for the state to execute someone who is 
innocent?" for the question ''Is it permissible for the state to 
4. Because 99 percent of death row inmates are male.;, I generally usc the mascu-
line pronoun when referring to the death row population. 
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kill?" Virtually no one feels the urge to execute an innocent 
man, but many feel the urge to execute someone who is guilty. 
A truthful and honest death penalty film must face that fact. 
When family members of a murder victim express a desire to see 
the murderer executed, they are expressing a passion which 
nearly everyone who has seen a loved one murdered has felt. 
The Hollywood films show human beings experiencing this pow-
erful passion; the documentaries do not. 
Of course, the state itself does not experience passion. The 
state must act on principle. The theoretical question, therefore, 
is not whether the state may execute an innocent, but rather 
whether there is some principle that supports the state's commis-
sion of homicide, notwithstanding the moral proposition that 
killing is wrong. This is the very question that the Hollywood 
films raise. How is it possible for the state legitimately to carry 
out an act that is inherently wrong? The Hollywood movies sug-
gest that there is no satisfactory answer to this question; the 
documentaries avoid it altogether. 
In this respect, the documentaries mirror society in their 
avoidance of complexity. For example, in the typical execution, 
we attempt to elide the troubling moral concerns by insisting 
that we are actually saving lives by taking one, or by characteriz-
ing the execution victim not as a human being but as a rabid 
animal. These devices are subterfuges that we employ in an ef-
fort to evade the truth. But the truth is a tireless and stubborn 
thing.5 The Hollywood films concede that the retributive im-
pulse is a powerful human emotion, yet they further suggest that 
it is an impulse we ought to resist. It is not wrong for human be-
ings to experience the desire for vengeance; it is wrong for the 
state to act on it. The documentaries avoid the subject alto-
gether. 
5. Sec Ex parte Tucker, 973 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Cr. App. 1998) (en bane); I discuss 
the Tucker case in The Humanity of Karla Faye Tucker, 90:3 The Texas Observer 4 (Feb. 
13, 1998), available at <http://www.texasobscrver.org/subjects/cditorials/2.13.98.dd.html>, 
and in Tucker's Execution Begs Re~o·amping of Texas System, Houston Chronicle 23 (Feb. 
4 1998), available at 1998 WL 3559625. Many proponents of capital punishment urged 
mercy in the Tucker case, including, perhaps most famously •. Pat Robertson, who has 
since supported a general moratorium on the death penalty owmg to the number of mno-
cent men who have been sent there. Sec Steven A. Holmes, Look Who's Questioning the 
Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Week in Review 3 (Apr. 16, 2000). 
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B. THE PRACTICAL 
When it comes to the practical issues, as well, the Holly-
wood movies are much fuller, and therefore more honest, than 
the documentaries. There is a sense, of course, in which the 
problem of executing an innocent man is a practical problem, 
but the Hollywood movies apprehend that the fact that there are 
innocent men on death row is actually a symptom of a larger 
problem. The Hollywood films, unlike the documentaries, ad-
dress these larger problems. 
Many opponents of capital punishment feel the retributive 
impulse as strongly as the death penalty's most enthusiastic sup-
porters. Yet they are nonetheless against capital punishment. 
The reason is simply that whatever might be said about the mo-
rality of executions in principle, there is nothing that can be said 
in defense of the system of executions that we actually have. 
Name a component part of the death penalty apparatus-
lawyers, judges, juries, police-and you will have named some-
thing that is corrupt. This corruption is well known, and many 
details of it have been covered elsewhere.6 Nevertheless, I will 
briefly describe three of the most serious defects with the sys-
tem: inadequate counsel for indigent defendants, racism, and fi-
nally, lawlessness and arbitrariness in the courts. I will then ar-
gue in Part II that the Hollywood films have managed to capture 
all of these defects. 
1. Counsel7 
In law, as in life, one gets what one pays for. Calvin Bur-
dine did not have any money to hire counsel when he was ac-
cused of capital murder. As a result, the State of Texas was re-
quired to appoint one to represent him, because the Sixth 
Amendment provides that a criminal defendant has a right to be 
represented by counsel. Burdine's lawyer slept through portions 
6. The most assiduous chronicler of the unjustness of the current death penalty 
apparatus in America-from the arrest stage through ultimate execution-has b<.:en 
Stephen B. Bright. Significant articles of his illuminating the present system include 
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Semence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst 
Lawyer, I 03 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994 ); Is Fairness Irrelevant: The Evisceration of Federal Ha-
beas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamelllal 
Rights, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. I (1997); Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Toler-
ance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penaltv, 35 Santa Clara L. R<.:v. 
433 (1995). Sec also Ira R. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review 
in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. I (1990). 
7. The discussion of counsd incompetence is based in significant part on cas<.:s of 
which I have first-hand knowledge. 
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of jury selection as well as through portions of the trial itself. 
Members of the jury as well as the trial judge's law clerk saw him 
sleeping and subsequently testified under oath as to that fact. A 
federal district judge set aside Burdine's conviction and ruled 
that he must receive a new trial.8 (Remarkably, a split panel of 
the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Burdine was required to 
show predjudice and that he could do so only by identifying with 
specificity the precise moments when counsel was sleeping. See 
Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d. 950 (5th Cir. 2000), opinion va-
cated and rehearing en bane granted by 2000 WL 1785536 (Dec. 
5, 2000). The Fifth Circuit has since voted to reconsider the case 
en bane. If the entire Fifth Circuit upholds the panel's decision, 
it would not be surprising for the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari review.) 
What is unique about the Burdine case is that the federal 
court ruled in his favor. The fact that Burdine was represented 
by a sleeping lawyer is not a distinctive feature of his case.9 It 
may not be common for lawyers to sleep during capital murder 
trials, but it was common for the particular lawyer who repre-
sented Burdine to sleep. In fact, one of the witnesses who testi-
fied that the lawyer was sleeping also stated that it was common 
knowledge that this lawyer slept during trial proceedings. 10 Yet 
he was appointed to represent numerous capital murder defen-
dants. At least a dozen former residents of death row- they are 
former residents because they have been executed-were repre-
sented by this single lawyer. 
Another death row inmate in Texas, a woman named Pam 
Perillo, recently prevailed on her legal claim in the Fifth Circuit 
because her lawyer, while supposedly representing Perillo, was 
also having a close personal relationship with one of the State's 
primary witnesses. Moreover, the lawyer appointed to represent 
Perillo had previously represented a different defendant in con-
nection with the same crime, and his strategy in that prior de-
fense had been to blame all wrongdoing on Perillo. 11 The pre-
cise contours of the conflict of interest present in the Perillo case 
are somewhat unusual, but not as unique as one might hope. In 
8. Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854 (S.D. Tex. 1999); sec also Burdine v. 
Johnson, 87 F. Supp. 2d 711 (S.D. Tex. 2000). 
9. Sec David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. 
Rev. 691 (1996). The Carl Johnson case is referred to in the court's order in Burdine, but 
Johnson had already been executed, in September 1995. 
10. 66 F. Supp. 2d at 857. 
II. Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775,786 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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fact, one capital murder defendant was represented by a lawyer 
who was having an affair with the defendant's wife. In the midst 
of the trial, the defendant was served with divorce papers, and 
following the conviction of the defendant, the lawyer proceeded 
to marry the death row inmate's former wife. 12 A defendant 
who is facing a death sentence is probably better off being repre-
sented by a lawyer who does not have designs on that defen-
dant's wife. A capital murder defendant is also best served by 
having a lawyer who has not traded representation for book 
rights to the client's story, but the lawyer who represented Betty 
Lou Beets, the second woman executed in Texas since Recon-
struction, did exactly that. 13 
Sexual conflicts of interest are not terribly common, but 
conflicts of interest in general are rampant. For example, law-
yers appointed to represent indigent capital defendants have, in 
order to justify their claim for greater compensation, at times 
represented co-defendants- a situation that is ripe with conflict 
potential. In one notorious case, a single lawyer represented co-
defendants even though the excuse of one of the defendants was 
that the other one had pulled the trigger and fired the fatal shots. 
In another case, a defendant was convicted and sentenced to 
death and then prevailed in his appeals and was therefore the 
beneficiary of a new trial. At his second trial, he was repre-
sented by the man who had served as the foreman of the jury at 
the first trial-in other words, he was represented by someone 
who had already deemed him guilty and sentenced him to 
death. 14 Charles Bass, who was executed in 1986, turned himself 
in to authorities after consulting with a lawyer who, unbe-
knownst to Bass, had entered into a contract with a filmmaker 
who was producing a film based on the life of Bass's murder vic-
tim; the attorney received $5000 from the film company in ad-
vance and a promise of additional cash if Bass in fact surren-
dered. When Bass argued on appeal that he had not only 
received ineffective assistance but had in fact been betrayed by 
his lawyer, the court of appeals ruled against him, reasoning that 
12. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. McMaster, 598 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980) 
(en bane). 
13. Sec Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1995), cc.:rt. denied, 517 U.S. 1157 
(1996). 
14. Sec Ex-Jury Foreman Defends Afurder Suspect in 3d Trial, N.Y. Times A20 
(Nov. 3, 1988}. 
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the law(ser who betrayed Bass did not ultimately represent him 
at trial. 5 
Sometimes the incompetence of lawyers who represent in-
digent defendants can be attributed to a conflict of interest, but 
at other times, it is attributable to nothing other than the sheer 
ineptitude of the lawyer. Thus, for example, one defendant was 
represented by counsel who, during his closing argument, said, 
"You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got this man's 
life in your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I've got to 
say." The lawyer then sat down. He was finished with his clos-
ing.16 Harvey Duffy was represented by a lawyer who had never 
tried a capital case; the lawyer spent less than a day picking the 
jury-even though jury selection is perhaps the most critical 
phase of a capital murder trial. 17 A handful of defendants have 
been represented by lawyers who did not raise even a single ob-
jection throughout the course of the trial. 18 One unfortunate de-
fendant was represented by a lawyer who showed up drunk at 
the trial, 19 and another defendant, a Hisfanic, had his lawyer re-
fer to him during the trial as a wetback.2 
Lawyers representing capital defendants do not perform 
any better on apveal. One appellate lawyer filed a brief that was 
one page long.2 Another lawyer continually failed to meet 
deadlines for filing the appellate pleadings and was therefore 
jailed for contempt. The lawyer ultimately filed a brief that was 
eight pages long, which he wrote from a jail cell.22 A lawyer in 
Alabama filed a brief for a man named Larry Heath that was 
one-page long. The lawyer cited a single case-a case that went 
against his position. The brief had more typographical errors 
than it had citations to authority. And yet, when Heath was fi-
nally fortunate enough to obtain competent counsel, all the is-
sues he might have raised on appeal were deemed to have been 
defaulted by the previous lawyer?3 
The problem with starting to tell stories about attorney in-
eptitude is that one can go on telling stories for a long, long time. 
15. Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983). 
16. Romero v. Collins, 884 F.2d 871,875 (5th Cir. 1989). 
17. Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980) (en bane). 
18. Sec, e.g., Ex parte £arvin. 816 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Cr. App. 1991) (en bane). 
19. Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205, 1213 (5th Cir. 1989). 
20. Ex parte Guzman, 730 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987) (en bane). 
21. Sec Bright, 103 Yale L.J. at1835 (cited in note 6). . 
22. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd in part and n:v'd m 
part sub nom. Nichols v. Scocc, 69 F.3d 1255 (5th Cir. 1995). 
23. Bright,103 Yale L.J. at1860-61 (cited in note 6). 
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But I should add one final point, and that is that even when the 
lawyers are good-and there are many very fine lawyers ap-
pointed to represent indigent capital defendants- they are pre-
vented from mounting a fully effective defense. Two obstacles 
stand in their way, one concrete and one somewhat more ab-
stract. The concrete obstacle is that they are paid insufficient 
wages. For example, the two lawyers who represented accused 
cop-killer Carl Wayne Buntion were awarded $30,000 less than 
they had requested. 24 The lawyer who represented Federico 
Martinez-Macias was paid at the princely rate of $11.84 per 
hour. 25 Once defense lawyers know that their bills will be scruti-
nized with hyper-zealousness by trial judges who are loathe to 
authorize the spending of taxpayer dollars for the representation 
of an accused murderer, defense lawyers will stop doing anything 
that they think they might not get reimbursed for. Genuinely 
competent counsel do whatever must be done to represent their 
clients effectively- witness the efforts of Michael Tigar who rep-
resented Terry Nichols in the Oklahoma city bombing trial or 
any of the members of the O.J. Simpson defense team. Lawyers 
who are worried about whether they will get paid do less. 
Second, and somewhat more abstractly, in many states, in-
cluding Texas, the trial lawyers are appointed not by a central 
appointing authority, but instead by the trial judge who will pre-
side over the case. This means, obviously, that the lawyer is 
serving two masters: the defendant, but also the judge. If the 
lawyer offends or alienates the judge, the lawyer will not be re-
ceiving any more appointments. The same dilemma confronts 
appellate lawyers, who are appointed by judges who sit on the 
Court of Appeals. Even lawyers of the firmest moral fiber can-
not help but feel the impact of this conflict. Harris County, 
where Houston is located, sends more men to death row than 
any single state (other than Virginia and, of course, Texas). In 
Harris County, there are 22 criminal district court judges with 
jurisdiction over capital cases. Of the 22, 16 have received cam-
paign contributions from lawyers who have been appointed to 
represent capital defendants since the beginning of 1998.26 This 
24. Sec Rad Sallee, T«·o Bumion Lawyers Threaren To Sue o~w Legal Fees, Cosrs, 
Houston Chronicle 20A (Feb. 27, 1991), available at 1991 WL 3905792. Sec l!encrallv 
David R. Dow, Teague and Dearh: The lmpacr of Curren/ Rerroacril·irv Do~rrine 0;1 
Capiral Defendams, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 23, 36 and nn.17~. 179 ( 1991) · 
25. Marrinez-Afacias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992). 
26. These data arc on file with the author. Moreover, of the twenty-two judges. 
twenty-one arc former prosecutors. 
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cozy relationship may be pleasant for the prosecutors, judges, 
and defense counsel, but it does not best serve the interests of 
the capital defendant. 
Perhaps the most important quality a lawyer representing 
capital murder defendants must possess is the willingness to be 
loathed. Lawyers who represent terrorists or mass murderers, or 
even simple murderers, must be willing to be reviled by the fam-
ily members of the murder victims, by demagogic politicians, by 
the popular media, even by the presiding judges themselves. A 
lawyer who must count on having his or her bill paid by a judge 
who is accountable to the electorate will almost never be willing 
to incur such enmity. The rare lawyer who has such character 
will probably be appointed to represent only one fortunate de-
fendant; the next time, the judge will find someone who is more 
compliant. 
2. Racism 
Over 17,000 executions have occurred in the United States. 
Of that number, a total of 35 have involved a white murderer 
and a black victim. In Texas, the death penalty capital of the 
western world, there has never been a white man executed for 
the murder of a black person. In 1998, three white men chained 
James Byrd, a black man, to the back of their pickup and 
dragged him for miles, killing him. Two of the three were sen-
tenced to death. Until they arrived at death row in 1999, there 
had never even been a white murderer on Texas' death row 
whose victim was black. 
These data are hardly unique to Texas. In Georgia, for ex-
ample, blacks represent 60 percent of all homicide victims, yet 80 
percent of those executed are executed for killing a white. In 
Kentucky, over 1,000 blacks have been murdered since 1977, but 
of the 28 people on death row, not a single one is there for kill-
ing a black. 
These data have been known for many years. Over a dec-
ade ago, a group of researchers, led by David Baldus, examined 
more than 2,000 homicides in Georgia and, as part of the exami-
nation, analyzed more than 200 different variables: race of vic-
tim, race of offender, economic status of victim and offender, de-
tails of the crime, etc. They determined that although black 
murderers were significantly more likely than white murderers 
to be sentenced to death, the truly dramatic variable was the 
race of the victim: Murderers of whites were between 4 and 5 
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times as likely to be sentenced to death as murderers of blacks. 
This essential finding has been replicated in every state in which 
the study has been conducted.27 Nationwide, whites make up 
slightly less than half the total number of murder victims, but 
more than 80 percent of those executed are executed for killing a 
white.Z8 
Not all scholars agree that the race of the accused plays a 
significant role in determining which defendants are sentenced 
to death; nevertheless, it is fair to say that a broad consensus ac-
knowledge the impact of the race of the victim.29 Not even the 
Supreme Court has denied this fact. Nevertheless, in 1987, in the 
case of McCleskey v. Kemp,30 the Court denied relief to 
McCleskey, a black man sent to death row for murdering a white 
victim, on the grounds that McCleskey's statistical showing did 
not demonstrate that racism had operated in his particular case. 
The dissenting Justices complained that the burden the majority 
placed on McCleskey could never be met; all any death row in-
mate can show are statistics. At some point, those statistics must 
be permitted to speak for themselves. 
As Lon Fuller's hypothetical Justice Keen once put it, there 
is such a thing as overexplaining the obvious. 31 The obvious fact 
is that America has not solved its race problem, and one domain 
that highlights this problem is the realm of criminal justice. Race 
is an issue in the capital punishment arena because it is an issue 
in America. Any truthful portrait of death row, to be truthful, 
must illuminate this inescapable fact, and any supporter of capi-
tal punishment must come to grips with it. 
27. Sec David C. Baldus. Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638 (1998); John H. Blume, Post-McClcsky Racial Dis-
crimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1771 (1998); Gen. Gov't Div., 
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Rep. GGD-90-57, Death Penalty Semencing: Research In-
dicates Pauem of Racial Disparities (Feb. 26, 1990) (summarizing data from more than 20 
studies); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Semencing, 75 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 26 (2000). 
28. Current statistics, as well as links to death penalty sites, both pro and con, can 
be found at the website of the Death Pcnaltv Information Center 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org. · ' 
29. Sec. e.g., John C. McAdams, Racial Disparity and the Death Penalty, 61 L. & 
Contcmp. Prob. 153 (1998). 
30. 481 U.S.279(1987). 
31. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616 
(1949). 
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3. Arbitrariness 
When the Supreme Court struck down all then-existing 
death penalty laws in 1972, it did so in part because the Justices 
could make no sense of why some defendants were sentenced to 
death and others who had committed identical, if not more hei-
nous, crimes were not. Justice Stewart, in an evocative meta-
phor, complained that the chances of being sentenced to death 
were akin to the likelihood of being struck by lightning.32 Nei-
ther fate is rationally explicable. That type of arbitrariness, the 
Court ruled, was inconsistent with due process and the rule of 
law. 
Immediately following the Court's decision, most states re-
wrote their death penalty statutes with the goal of reserving the 
death penalty for the most horrific crimes and the most brutal 
criminals. The past two and a half decades of capital punish-
ment, however, have proven that achieving consistency or ra-
tionality is chimerical. Prosecutors retain discretion not to seek 
the death penalty even where it is legally warranted, and juries 
retain the power not to sentence defendants to death even when 
those defendants qualify for the death penalty.33 
In early 1999, Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan commuted 
the death sentence of Darrel J. Mease to a sentence of life in 
prison following a brief conversation with Pope John Paul II, 
who asked Governor Carnahan to show mercy towards Mease. 
Mease is a triple-murderer who was convicted in 1988 of killing 
Lloyd Lawrence and his wife Frankie, along with their disabled 
grandson William.34 It would take an uncommon measure of 
churlishness for a death penalty foe to begrudge Darrell Mease 
his victory, but the simple truth is that he got lucky because the 
Pope mentioned him by name and Governor Carnahan, for 
whatever reason, was moved by the Pope's appeal. Webster's 
dictionary defines "arbitrary" as unprincipled or capricious. To 
the hundreds of men (and the handful of women) on death row 
in America whose names the Pope does not know, that is the 
perfect word to describe why they will die even though Mease 
will not. 
32. Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1lJ72). 
33. On the role of prosecutorial discretion, sec Jeffrey C. Pokorak, Probing the 
Capital Prosecwor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 
1811 (1lJlJ8). 
34. St:e Gustav Niebuhr, Pope's Appeal Saves Killer in Missouri, Portland Orego-
nian AI (Jan. 2lJ, 19lJlJ). available at 1lJlJlJ WL 5315052. 
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If arbitrariness were solely the result of prosecutorial discre-
tion and the behavior of juries, there would be no legal basis to 
complain about it. Ironically, however, the single factor most re-
sponsible for perpetuating arbitrariness in the carrying out of the 
death penalty is the unwillingness of judges to insist that the law 
be followed in all cases. Judges at every level, state and federal, 
seem to have grown weary of death penalty appeals, with the 
consequence that executions proceed apace even in the face of 
egregious constitutional violations. Thus, through the mid 1980s, 
2 out of every 5 death sentences were set aside on constitutional 
grounds; since the late 1980s or early 1990s, the number has 
dropped precipitously, and now the perct:ntage of successful 
death penalty appeals is in the single digits.3) 
Two recent pairs of cases from Texas illustrate the problem. 
The first involved Troy Farris, who was sentenced to death in 
1983 for killing a police officer. In his appeal to the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals (CCA), he complained that the prosecutors 
unconstitutionally excluded from the jury a woman who was op-
posed to the death genalty. Under the Witherspoon line of Su-
preme Court cases, prosecutors are permitted to exclude a po-
tential juror who says it would be impossible for him or her to 
impose the death penalty, but it is not permissible to strike a ju-
ror just because he or she is in principle against capital punish-
ment. If the juror swears that she would be able to carry out her 
legal duty, she cannot legally be excluded. The sound idea of the 
Witherspoon line is that prosecutors cannot be permitted to em-
panel a jury that is predisposed toward death. 
In Farris's case, the court ruled that the exclusion of a cer-
tain juror was permissible because she had "vacillated" on the 
question of whether she could adhere to her oath.37 Four years 
later, however, Michael Riley raised the same Witherspoon issue 
in the CCA, complaining that prosecutors had wrongfully ex-
cluded a juror. This time the Texas court realized that it had 
previously misapprehended federal law, and the court granted 
Riley relief;38 moreover, the court in Riley expressly overruled its 
decision in Farris. 39 
35. Sec David R. Dow, America's Death Machine, 10 Crim. L.F. 387 (1999). 
36. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); 
Wainwright v. \Viu, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
37. Farris v. State, 819 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Cr. App. 1991) (en bane). The "vacillating 
juror" problem is associated with Wainwright v. Wiu. 
38. Riley v. State, 889 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Cr. App. 1994) (en bane). 
39. !d. at 299. 
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As it turned out, Farris had not yet been executed. So he 
went back to court-first state and then federal-and argued 
that the CCA had acknowledged that it had been wrong in his 
case and that he should therefore obtain the same relief that Ri-
ley received. His appeal was rejected, and he was executed in 
1998.40 
In 1999, an even more striking inconsistency occurred in 
Texas. Two inmates were set to be executed on consecutive 
days: Danny Barber was set to die on a Tuesday, and Stan 
Faulder was scheduled for execution on Wednesday, the very 
next day. Barber's lawyers, believing that they had exhausted 
their legal claims, were telling their client goodbye. Faulder's 
lawyers, in the meantime, were persuading a federal judge in 
Austin that the State's clemency proceedings are constitutionall.X 
defective, and the judge therefore granted Faulder a stay. 1 
Faulder's lawyers contacted Barber's lawyers and Barber 
authorized the identical issue to be raised in his case. He too re-
ceived a stay from the same federal judge.42 
The State appealed both cases. On Tuesday afternoon the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to disturb the stay 
in Barber's case. Yet the next day, a different panel of judges 
from the same court of appeals did dissolve the stay in Faulder's 
case. Both inmates had raised the identical legal claim; indeed, 
the exact same pleadings were used by both sets of lawyers- all 
that differed was the name of the party seeking relief. The court 
of appeals added a footnote to its opinion in the Faulder case ac-
knowledging that it was aware that a different group of judges 
had, on the previous day, halted an execution on the same 
grounds; but the panel did not explain why it was pursuing a dif-
ferent course.43 (The Supreme Court did eventually stay 
Faulder's execution, though the legal basis for its decision re-
mains unclear.) 
So Michael Riley obtained relief when his lawyers per-
suaded the CCA to overrule the decision in Farris, whereas Far-
40. Sec Farris v. Johnson, 967 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tcx 1997), atrd 144 F.3d 50 (5th 
Cir.), ccrt. denied, 525 U.S. 1004 (1998). 
41. Sec Faulder v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (re-
counting procedural history), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1017 (1999). 
42. None of the opinions relating to the clemency issue in the Barber litigation is 
published. The Supreme Court's denial of relief is located at 525 U.S. 1132 (1999) .. I 
have previously criticized the refusal of the courts-both state and federal-to pubhsh 
their opinions in death penalty cases. Sec Dow, 37 B.C. L. Rev. at 708 (cited in note 9). 
The details in the text arc based on my first-hand knowledge of the cases. 
43. The opinion is unpublished; a copy is on file with the author. 
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ris was struck by lightning. And Danny Barber, who was alerted 
to the existence of a legal issue by Faulder, had his legal victory 
upheld on appeal while Faulder's was set aside. (Both Faulder 
and Barber have since been executed.) The phrase "death pen-
alty law" might not quite be an oxymoron, but Justice Stewart 
would notice no difference between the system we have today 
and the regime he condemned 25 years ago. Indeed, it is for this 
very reason that Justice Blackmun, who voted in favor of the 
state in death penalty cases throughout the 1970s and 1980s, fi-
nally announced in 1994 that he would "no longer ... tinker with 
the machinery of death."44 
One reason that arbitrariness has become so difficult to 
eradicate is that, in the domain of death penalty law, judges have 
grown weary of the appellate process. When modern death pen-
alty jurisprudence began to develop in the 1970s, the Supreme 
Court assumed that appellate judges would, by examining death 
penalty appeals with assiduous care, eliminate arbitrary sentenc-
ing.45 For many years, appellate judges did so, with somewhere 
between 40 and 60 percent of death sentences being set aside by 
federal courts. 46 But along the way, judges somehow grew weary 
of these cases. They became more interested in speeding execu-
tions along than in scrutinizing proceedings in capital cases. This 
weariness has manifested itself in two ways. The first is that 
judges will occasionally direct angry exasperation toward law-
yers representing condemned men. 47 
The second exemplification of this weariness is found in the 
systematic narrowing of the universe of claims that death row 
inmates are even permitted to bring. For example, the Court has 
indicated that a claim of actual innocence is not, standing alone, 
a cognizable claim on habeas review. 48 It has held that death 
row inmates are not entitled to counsel in order to pursue collat-
eral (i.e., habeas) relief9 -meaning that the Court has sanc-
tioned the execution of men who, at the time of execution, are 
44. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari). 
45. Sec, e.g.,Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
46. See Dow, 10 Crim. L.F. at 387 (cited in note 35); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 
I, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting reversal rate in capital post-conviction ap-
peals of 60-70 percent). 
47. See, e.g., David R. Dow, Fromiers of Justice, 80 Texas Observer 9-10 (Nov. 25, 
1988) (concerning former death row inmate Walter Bell); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 
849 (1994). 
48. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
49. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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unrepresented by counsel. Justice Scalia has even implied that 
lawyers who represent death row inmates in their collateral pro-
ceedinSs were "guerillas," bent on subverting the will of the ma-
jority.5 What is extraordinary about Justice Scalia's tirade-
aside from the fact of the tirade itself-is that he delivered it in a 
case in which the death row inmate argued simply that he was 
entitled to have the sentencing jury know that he would be ineli-
gible for parole under state law should he be sentenced to life in 
prison (rather than death). 51 Seven Justices, all but Scalia and 
Thomas, agreed on the result. As Justice Blackmun put it for 
the plurality, "The State may not create a false dilemma by ad-
vancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future 
dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the jury from 
learning that the defendant will never be released on parole. "52 
That such a result could prompt Justice Scalia's outburst is stun-
ning. Of course, there has long been a strain of popular opinion 
that cares not a whit about constitutional rights if the guilt of the 
defendant is not in question. This very attitude is what animates 
lynch mobs. When Justices of the Supreme Court direct such 
venomous fury against lawyers even in a case in which the death 
row inmate prevails by a lopsided vote, they sanction and even 
participate in this lynch mob mentality.53 And when death pen-
alty movies focus on innocence, they let these Justices get away 
with it. 
* * * * * 
The simple and inescapable truth of the matter is that the 
death penalty system we have is illegitimate. Indigent defen-
dants commonly receive incompetent lawyers. Competent law-
yers are commonly denied resources necessary to mount effec-
tive defenses. Trial judges in most states with the death penalty 
are elected officials, with the consequence that there is political 
pressure on them to ensure that capital defendants are convicted 
and sentenced to death. Black defendants are more likely to re-
ceive the death sentence, all other things being equal, than white 
defendants, and murderers of white victims are more than twice 
as likely to be sentenced to death as murderers of nonwhite vic-
tims. Appellate judges ignore the law. The death penalty may 
50. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 156. 
52. Id.at171. 
53. Simmons is not the only case in which Justice Scalia has expressed this antipa-
thy toward death penalty lawyers. See McFarland v. Scali, 512 U.S. 849 (1994) (tran-
script of oral argument), available at 1994 WL 665012 sub nom. McFarland v. Collins. 
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well be illegitimate even in a noncorrupt world, but that is an ar-
gument for philosophers because the world we actually have is 
one in which the death penalty apparatus is corrupt from head to 
toe. This truth is hidden in most documentaries. Ironically, 
however, it is a truth that fiction illuminates rather well. 
II. FICTIONAL DOCUMENTARIES AND TRUTHFUL 
FICTIONS 
Let me be clear about one thing at the outset: I am not urg-
ing that documentary film-makers and lawyers and journalists 
cease their efforts to identify individuals who have been wrong-
fully convicted; I am suggesting that the recent obsession with 
claims of innocence has obscured the fact that innocence is a 
symptom of a larger, systemic corruption. 
Thus, The Thin Blue Line, a film that led directly to Randall 
Dale Adams's release from death row, has nothing to do with 
the philosophical issue of the death penalty's moral legitimacy. 
Similarly, Fourteen Days in May, which details the final two 
weeks of the life of a death row inmate who suffered nearly 
every injustice that the capital punishment regime can serve up, 
ultimately elects to focus on the inmate's claim of innocence, 
thereby blunting the force of, and even obscuring, all else. 
Yet to a committed death penalty advocate, executing an 
innocent man is simply the cost of doing business, the price of an 
imperfect justice system. Few would say that aloud, perhaps but 
anyone who supports capital punishment must believe it, for the 
evidence of wrongful convictions is simply incontestable. 54 
Someone who believes that the death penalty is inherently 
wrong cheats by focusing solely on innocent inmates. Worse, 
this cheating tends to legitimate the increasingly entrenched le-
gal doctrine that holds that unless an inmate can prove that he 
did not actually commit the crime for which he was sentenced, 
then virtually any constitutional violation can be overlooked. 55 
Surely innocence should matter, but it should not be all that mat-
ters. Constitutional values and moral norms are not applicable 
only to the wrongly accused. 
54. See Dow, 10 Crim. LF. at 387 (cited in note 35). 
55. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). 
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A. THE PROBLEM OF INNOCENCE. 
Death penalty films that focus on innocence are probably 
both a cause and a result of the recent public fascination with the 
issue of innocence. Yet although public attention to the issue of 
innocents being executed has reached new heights, the issue it-
self is hardly new. Indeed, since Gary Gilmore was executed by 
firing squad in Utah in 1977, beginning the modern death pen-
alty era, there have been nearly 13 people released from death 
row in America for every 100 killed. Despite this staggering sta-
tistic, popular support for the death penalty increased steadily 
from the mid 1970s through the late 1980s, and remained at a 
high level until the last year or two, when support dropped 
somewhat (though not precipitously).56 Part of this drop may 
well be attributable to the surge in attention paid to wrongful 
convictions. The most dramatic event to contribute to this focus 
on innocence was almost certainly the decision by George Ryan, 
the Republican governor of Illinois, to halt executions in his 
state. He did so because since the death penalty resumed in Illi-
nois, there have been more men released from death row after 
being found innocent than have been executed. Subsequently, 
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a bill, the Inno-
cence Protection Act of 2000, that would make DNA testing 
available to state and federal inmates, regardless of the amount 
of time that has transpired since their convictions, 57 and a similar 
measure has been adopted in the House. 58 
Everybody is interested in innocence, in other words. The 
problem is that the issue of innocence has all but obscured the 
fact that the death penalty system fails, in one sense or another, 
in nearly every case. And what is particularly extraordinary 
about this turn of events is that the documentaries have contrib-
uted to the obfuscation while the Hollywood movies have grap-
pled with the entire range of issues. I will illustrate this claim by 
discussing in some detail each of the four principal films. 
B. THE MOVIES 
The Green Mile 
The Green Mile is set in Louisiana during the Depression. 
The film is based on a work by Stephen King, and King helped 
56. See Holmes, Look Who's Questioning the Death Penalty at 3 (cited in note 5). 
57. !d. 
58. !d. 
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adapt the work for the screen. It stars Tom Hanks, who plays 
Paul Edgecomb, the chief guard on death row, and Michael 
Clarke Duncan, who plays an inmate named John Coffey. 
There are also magnificent performances from Sam Rockwell, 
who plays the film's most truly despicable character, a multiple 
murdered named William "Wild Bill" Wharton; from Doug 
Hutchison, who plays the film's second most despicable charac-
ter, a malignant prison guard named Percy Wetmore; from 
David Morse, who plays Hanks's first assistant, a guard named 
Brutus "Brutal" Howell; and from Michael Jeter, who plays a 
truly charming death row inmate named Eduard Delacroix. 
Coffey is convicted of a double murder. He is black, and he 
is huge. With the Herculean Coffey standing next to him, Hanks 
looks like a pygmy. We eventually learn that Coffey is not dim-
witted, but he seems as if he might be. Coffey speaks slowly and 
tentatively, giving the impression of mild retardation or, as he is 
characterized by one of the guards, a simpleton. His first words 
in the movie are "Yes sir, boss. I can talk." He is a character 
who embodies three distinct stereotypes. Initially, he is the fear-
some Negro: supernaturally strong and intellectually lame. Then 
he transmogrifies into a second stereotype: preternaturally 
strong and perfectly meek, the gentle giant. And at last we learn 
that Coffey in fact possesses supernatural powers; he becomes 
the Jesus figure: a man who, with his touch, can heal illness; a 
man who can see into the hearts of his fellow human beings and 
know whether they are evil; a man of pure, unadulterated good-
ness; a man who is killed not because he has done anything 
wrong, but because he is feared, because killing him will satisfy 
an appetite that will otherwise not be sated. 
We do not see any of Coffey's trial, but we do not need to. 
Two young white girls were found dead in Coffey's arms. In 
Louisiana in the 1930s, that was all the evidence the State 
needed. The father of the girls notices them missing, then dis-
covers blood and torn clothing. Fearing the worst, he calls the 
sheriff, who assembles a posse. Dozens of men armed with rifles 
and shotguns fan out through the Louisiana countryside. At last 
the men come upon Coffey, who is sitting with his arms around 
the girls, sobbing hysterically, saying over and over that he had 
come too late. At the time we do not know what this means; we 
later discover that Coffey had been unable to revive the girls, 
who had been murdered by Wild Bill. The sheriff stands by for 
several moments while the girls' father punches Coffey repeat-
edly about the head and face. Coffey offers no resistance. The 
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scene is Louisiana in the 1930s, and we watch the scene tensely, 
knowing that Coffey could easily have been lynched. 
Coffey is convicted of abducting and murdering the two 
young white girls and sent off to death row. We do not see his 
lawyer's performance, but we can be certain that it was worse 
than perfunctory, for when we later meet the lawyer, we meet a 
man who never believed in his client and had no sympathy for 
him or his fate. We meet a lawyer who thinks of his former cli-
ent as sub-human, as unworthy of a defense. In short, we meet 
the typical, southern death penalty lawyer that an indigent de-
fendant would have. 
Coffey arrives at the prison and the guards are awestruck-
literally mesmerized- by his size. They warn Hanks to be wary, 
but Hanks does not fear him. Coffey puts up no resistance, just 
as he showed none when he encountered the posse. He steps 
into his cell and it is as if he has donned a tee shirt that is several 
sizes too small. 
In the course of the film, we see a total of four inmates on 
death row: Coffey, Wharton, Delacroix, and an Indian named 
Arlen Bitterbuck (played by Graham Greene). There does not 
appear to be any question as to whether the latter three in fact 
committed the crimes for which they were sentenced to die. 
Coffey, however, is a different story. He is a Christ-like figure 
with mystical, supernatural powers. He caresses a dead mouse in 
his huge hands and brings the mouse (Delacroix's pet, who is 
named Mr. Jangles), back to life. He heals Hanks' bladder infec-
tion by grabbing Hanks' crotch through the iron bars of his cell 
and squeezing. He sucks a life threatening brain tumor out of 
the head of the warden's wife. He can see into the hearts of 
men. When Wild Bill first arrives at death row, Coffey whispers 
"be careful," and moments later, Wild Bill attacks the guards. 
Towards the end of the film, in the scene immediately pre-
ceding the execution, Coffey channels a portion of his power 
into Hanks and allows Hanks to see into the past: to see that 
Wild Bill committed the double murder for which Coffey was 
sentenced to death. Hanks knows that he will be executing an 
innocent man, and he asks Coffey whether he wants him to fos-
ter an escape. Coffey demurs. Hanks is pulled between justice 
and order, and, in the end, he embraces order. 
Virtually every disgraceful dimension of the modern death 
penalty regime makes an appearance in this film. Coffey is con-
victed because he is a black man and the victims are young white 
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girls. Coffey's own lawyer compares Coffey to a rabid dog, say-
ing that the only thing to do with him is to kill him. Most of the 
death row guards are amiable, though one is a malignant sadist. 
Like the documentaries, The Green Mile does have a central 
character who is innocent, but the difference between this film 
and either of the documentaries is that we know that Coffey 
ended up on death row because his lawyers were inept and be-
cause racism is a potent force. We see an innocent man die, but 
it is not all we see. We see how the execution of an innocent is a 
result of a myriad of lesser evils. 
Coffey's jailers know beyond any doubt that Coffey is inno-
cent. Yet they carry out the execution anyway, in a tension-
filled death chamber where one of the many witnesses, the fa-
ther of the two murdered little girls, shouts "kill him twice." 
Hanks cannot bring himself to order the executioner to throw 
the switch. God will want to know how Hanks could have killed 
one of His miracles, and what will Hanks say? That he was just 
doing his job? And yet, though he must be prodded by his assis-
tant to give the order to carry out the execution, in the end 
Hanks does so. He shuffles over to Coffey and clandestinely 
shakes his hand. Then he gives the order, and Coffey is electro-
cuted. 
Fourteen Days in May 
Gary Gilmore and Harold Lane are the answers to trivia 
questions: Gilmore, of course, was the first person executed in 
America following the reinstatement of the death penalty by the 
Supreme Court in 1976. Lane was the one-hundredth execution 
victim in the belt buckle of the death belt, the State of Texas. 
Edward Earl Johnson has no trivia question associated with his 
death. Were it not for a single accident, he would be all but for-
gotten, for he was the second person executed in Mississippi fol-
lowing resumption of the death penalty (and the seventy-third 
nationwide). Instead, however, Johnson's memory survives be-
cause the BBC commissioned a documentary about the last two 
weeks of his life at the Parchman Farm, in the Yazoo Delta in 
Sunflower County, Mississippi. 
In 1979 in a rural Mississippi town, an elderly woman 
named Sally Franklin was attacked in the boarding house she 
operated. One of her boarders heard the commotion and called 
the police. J.T. Trest, the town marshall, responded to the call. 
Trest was shot first with a small caliber pistol and then with his 
own gun. One witness believed that he had seen a Buick speed-
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ing away from the scene. Edward Earl Johnson was arrested be-
cause he owned a Buick. 
From the outset Johnson denied any involvement in the 
crime and said he had been at a bar when the crime occurred. 
No physical evidence connected Johnson to the crime. Franklin, 
the female victim of the assault, had known Johnson all his life, 
and when Johnson was arrested, she said he was not the crimi-
nal. The attacker, she said, was heavyset and bearded. Johnson 
was lean and without facial hair. He was eighteen years old at 
the time. After being questioned, Johnson was released. 
Several weeks later, however, with the case still unsolved, 
Johnson was arrested again. He continued to protest his inno-
cence. Asked whether he would take a polygraph, he agreed to 
do so. As he was being driven by Mississippi troopers to Jack-
son, Mississippi, where the test was to be administered, Johnson 
confessed to the murder. 
He subsequently recanted and insisted that he had been co-
erced. Johnson's story was that the troopers had told him that 
he would confess or they would shoot him and say that they had 
done so as he tried to escape. Johnson said that the troopers 
asked him, "Who is going to be around to contradict us, to say 
that is didn't happen the way we said?" None of the troopers 
makes an appearance in the film. In any case, although no 
physical evidence corroborated Johnson's guilt, neither did any 
physical evidence exonerate him. He was executed on May 20, 
1987, in the Mississippi gas chamber. The warden announced 
that he had lost consciousness within one minute after the cya-
nide hit the acid. The doctor announced that cardiac arrest, the 
proximate cause of death, did not occur until twelve minutes had 
gone by. 
FDM is mostly about Edward Johnson, but not exclusively. 
It is also about his family, and about the officials at the Parch-
man Farm who must carry out the execution. In this respect, 
though not as real as The Green Mile, it is substantially fuller 
than The Thin Blue Line, a film in which we meet no prison offi-
cials and no members of the death row inmate's family. In 
FDM, we meet Johnson's mother, his uncle, and his nieces who, 
in one excruciating scene, sing him songs that their church choir 
has been practicing. We meet his lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith, 
and see Smith move back and forth between comforting Johnson 
and pursuing last-minute appeals. We see Johnson sitting with 
his family when the Supreme Court rejects his final appeal, 
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hours before his execution. We see him eating his final meal. 
We see him, in short, as a human being, as someone who loves 
and is loved. 
We also meet the prison personnel who know Johnson and 
who are charged with carrying out the execution. The prison 
warden, Donald Cabana, is a larger than life figure. He is a 
Vietnam veteran who, upon his return from the war, began a ca-
reer in law enforcement that has taken him to the top position in 
the Mississippi criminal justice system. He is interviewed several 
times, and after being asked whether he supports the death pen-
alty, Cabana pauses and then "gives a qualified yes. "59 The cam-
era follows Cabana around the prison as he tends to details of 
the execution. We see him preside, for example, over several 
meetings at which he insists that his staff conduct themselves 
with decorum; he tells members of his staff that he worries about 
people who are eager to stand in line to kill someone; we hear 
Cabana say that he will terminate any guard who fails to com-
port himself with appropriate gravity. We see him making sure 
that Johnson has a comfortable place to lie down in the holding 
cell adjacent to the execution chamber. We see him asking 
Johnson what he wants for his final meal. We watch him as he 
tells Johnson what the final twenty-two minutes of his life will 
consist of. 
In one especially unusual scene, we see Cabana and his as-
sistants as they test the functionality of the Mississippi gas cham-
ber, which, at the time of Johnson's execution had not been used 
in a number of years. To check its operation, a cage with arab-
bit is placed on the chair to which the execution victim will be 
strapped, and cyanide pellets are dropped into acid. The rabbit 
twitches violently, hurling itself about its cage, before expiring. 
(An edited version of the film was shown on HBO in the early 
1990s. Not a single person called the station to complain about 
the execution of Edward Johnson, but several dozen called to 
complain about the killing of the rabbit.) 
The documentary, for all its balance, nevertheless fails to 
focus on the real problems that Johnson's execution exemplifies. 
Two-thirds of the death row population in Mississippi are poor, 
uneducated, black males. These inmates lack the resources to 
hire competent counsel. The lawyer who represented Johnson at 
59. Cabana has sine~ chang~d his mind and has written a hook in which he ex-
presses his opposition to capital punishment. Sec Donald A. Cabana, Death at Midnight: 
The Confessions of an Execwioner (Northwestern U. Press, 1996). 
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trial made no effort to locate the alibi witness. When Johnson 
finally obtained zealous and competent lawyers to pursue his 
collateral appeals, it was too late. The Mississippi Supreme 
Court determined that it would not address the merits of John-
son's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because it was 
waived by not having been raised previously. In all, of the ten 
claims that Johnson's lawyers presented, including a claim of a 
coerced confession, nine of the claims were di~osed of on pro-
cedural grounds, without examining the merits. 
One of the insidious canards in death penalty law, perpetu-
ated not only by members of the media, who might not know 
better, but also by federal judges, who surely must, is that death 
row inmates receive an inordinate number of appeals. What is 
meant by that criticism is that judges review the merits of a death 
row inmate's claims time and time again. The truth, of course, is 
quite different. Most appeals are disposed of as was Johnson's: 
on procedural grounds, where the court never reaches the merits 
of the claim. Because trial lawyers appointed to represent indi-
gent defendants are typically marginal, the result is that most of 
a defendant's cogent constitutional claims are procedurally de-
faulted as a consequence of the original lawyer's ineptitude; 
there is simply nothing that the subsequent lawyer can do. Ed-
ward Earl Johnson was executed despite having had no merits 
review of the principal issues on his appeal. This fact, however, 
cannot be gleaned from the film; the only way to learn it is to 
read the reported decision.61 
Instead, the film waters down even its strengths by its 
treatment of innocence. Johnson always claimed that he had an 
alibi. Several prison guards are interviewed, and one of them 
says that he as well as several others believe that Johnson is in-
nocent. Warden Cabana, on the other hand, although his tone 
lacks conviction, does say that he thinks Johnson did the crime. 
(He also says that although Johnson might deserve to die, he 
does not deserve to be first in line; he should be about number 
15 or 16, in Cabana's estimation.) After Johnson's execution is 
confirmed, we learn that his lawyers subsequently located the 
witness who could have supported Johnson's alibi: a woman he 
had met in a pool hall. She reportedly claims that she went to 
police when Johnson was arrested to tell them that Johnson 
could not be the guy, but, she says, she was instructed to go 
60. Johnson v. Srare, 508 So. 2d 1126,1127-28 (Miss. 1987). 
61. !d. 
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home and mind her business. Unfortunately, this information is 
communicated by subtitle, just before the film's credits roll. We 
never see the woman or hear her voice. Not only, then, is the 
exculpatory evidence not truly shown to us, but the strongest 
evidence of innocence- the only evidence that does not come 
directly from either Johnson or his lawyers-is thrown at us lit-
erally as the film is ending, thereby coloring everything that has 
come before with the overlay of innocence. 
The Thin Blue Line 
Randall Dale Adams may have been released from death 
row even had this film never been made, but he might also have 
been executed. Adams spent twelve years on death row after 
being convicted by a Dallas jury of the murder of Robert Wood, 
a Dallas police officer. 
From the moment of his arrest, Adams denied any involve-
ment in the crime, and his story remained consistent and con-
stant in every detail. He said that he had recently moved to Dal-
las to look for work, and had managed to find it. One night, on 
Thanksgiving weekend, he had run out of gas on the highway 
and pulled over to the side of the road. He was picked up by a 
young man named David Harris, whom Adams had never before 
met. Harris told Adams that he was out of work and was basi-
cally just passing through town. Adams, grateful for the assis-
tance, told Harris that he should stay in Dallas and look for work 
at the place where Adams worked as a laborer. The two men 
got something to eat and went to see a drive-in movie, but Ad-
ams was not interested in it and asked Harris drive him back to 
his hotel, where he was staying with his brother. According to 
Adams, he was back at his hotel before ten o'clock and was 
asleep before eleven. 
Shortly after midnight, Officer Wood and his partner no-
ticed a car without its headlights on. Wood turned on his patrol 
car's flashing lights and signaled the car to pull over. As Wood 
approached the driver's window, the car's occupant fired five 
shots, all of which struck Officer Wood, who bled to death on 
the side of the road. 
When police get shot on the job in Texas, and indeed in any 
state, no expense is spared in pursuing their killers. FDM, which 
also involves the murder of a peace officer, does not emphasize 
this salient fact; TBL does. Investigatory zealousness is not nec-
essarily a bad thing, but it can become so, when zeal outpaces 
judgment. Fifty investigators began an intense search for 
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Wood's killer. Unfortunately, several weeks and hundreds of 
man-hours were squandered because Wood's partner had told 
investigators that the car that had been pulled over was a blue 
Chevy Vega. In fact, the car had been a Mercury Comet. Police 
and other law enforcement officials tracked down virtually every 
blue Vega in the State of Texas looking for a bullet-riddled vehi-
cle. This investigative feat was an impressive achievement, but 
one that had only a negative impact on the investigation, be-
cause it meant that officers were not pursuing leads that had a 
chance of proving relevant. 
Aside from her mistaken description of the vehicle, Wood's 
partner also told investigators, originally, that the car that had 
been pulled over had only a single occupant. She said that the 
car's single occupant had been wearing some type of jacket with 
a fur collar. Only later did she say that there might have been 
two occupants after all. David Harris turned out to have been 
wearing that night a parka with a fur collar. Adams remembered 
this detail, and Harris's parka was later recovered. Randall Ad-
ams's only jacket, the one he wore that evening, was made of 
blue denim. 
In December, with Officer Wood's murder still unsolved, 
Harris was arrested for stealing a car in Vidor, Texas. Harris 
was well-known to local law enforcement authorities, and in the 
preceding weeks, he had been boasting to local residents about 
having shot a policeman in Dallas. Following his arrest for 
automobile theft, however, Harris said that he hadn't killed the 
Dallas officer after all but knew who had. At the time, Harris 
was ineligible for the death penalty because he was only sixteen. 
Adams was twenty-eight. The film implies that authorities were 
pleased to have a suspect they could lawfully execute. Adams 
was arrested on December 21st. 
Adams was not a career criminal. In fact, at the time he was 
tried for the murder of Officer Wood, Adams had never been 
convicted of, or even charged with, any crime. There was not a 
jot of physical evidence to connect him to the murder. There 
was not the faintest hint of a motive. Indeed, the evidence 
against Adams was remarkably thin: testimony from a reward-
seeking, attention-hungry, unemployed mother; and testimony 
from a sixteen-year-old career criminal. In exchange for provid-
ing this damning testimony, Harris, who was ineligible for the 
death penalty due to his age, was not charged with anything-:-
and charges pending against him in another state were mysten-
ously dropped. 
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In many respects Adams's case is unremarkable and just 
like Edward Johnson's case, but in one important regard Ad-
ams's case was quite unusual and radically different from John-
son's: Adams had competent trial counsel. His lawyers believed 
in him and fought aggressively. They were confident they would 
secure an acquittal, but they made two mistakes: first, they over-
estimated the importance of a lack of evidence in a case where a 
police officer has been killed, and second, they underestimated 
the persuasive effectiveness of David Harris's magnetic charm. 
The one witness who supported Harris's story was Emily 
Miller, a woman who had been recently fired from her job as a 
gas station cashier for stealing. Miller testified that she had seen 
a bushy-haired man shoot Officer Wood as she sat in the passen-
ger seat of a car that her husband was driving past the spot on 
the highway where the shooting occurred. Miller's husband, the 
driver, was black. Unlike his wife, he testified that he had seen 
nothing. Although Miller's husband was unable to verify his 
wife's story, Miller had an explanation for that: "Black people," 
she said, "they don't like getting involved." (It's hard to say 
whether her being married to a black man makes that statement 
less or more offensive.) Miller herself had come to the attention 
of the Dallas police after she was arrested for disorderly conduct 
and taken to the police station for booking. While there she 
volunteered that she knew something about the Wood murder. 
The disorderly conduct charge was dismissed, as were pending 
robbery charges against Miller's daughter. 
In Texas, capital trials proceed in two phases.62 In the first, 
the jury determines whether the accused is guilty of the offense: 
in Adams's case, the intentional murder of a police officer. The 
jury found him guilty on May 4th. The second stage is the pun-
ishment phase. By answering so-called special issues, the jury 
determines whether the defendant should be sentenced to life or 
death. At the time of Adams's trial, the jury was asked to an-
swer two questions: first, whether he had acted deliberately; and 
second, whether he would pose a reasonable probability of being 
d_ang~rous in the future. \following the ~upreme Court's deci-
siOn m Penry v. Lynaugh, the Texas legislature added a third 
question: if the jury answers the deliberateness and future dan-
ger questions in the affirmative, it must then consider whether, 
62. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. ~ 37.071 (2000). 
63. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
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in view of all the mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant, 
he should be sentenced to life rather than death. )64 
The first question is nearly always answered in the affirma-
tive because the jury has, in effect, already answered it at the 
guilt-innocence phase of the trial by concluding that the defen-
dant acted intentionally. In modern death penalty litigation, the 
critical question is probably the third one, but when Adams was 
tried, the critical question was the second. If the defendant 
could show that he would not be dangerous in the future, then 
the jury would answer the second question in the negative, and 
the sentence would be life rather than death. 
In order to persuade a jury to return a "yes" answer to the 
future dangerousness question, Texas prosecutors (as prosecu-
tors elsewhere) introduce so-called expert psychiatric testimony. 
In Adams's case, the devastating testimony came from one Dr. 
James Grigson, a man who, it is fair to say, is a discredited char-
latan. His behavior in the Adams case was typical of his modus 
operandi: he spent fifteen or twenty minutes interviewing Ad-
ams, a man to whom he had never before spoken. He then testi-
fied for more than two and one-half hours, asserting that Adams 
was a psychopath and would undoubtedly kill again. (The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals (the highest state court for criminal 
matters) has noted that Grigson is always one hundred percent 
certain of his opinion that the defendant against whom he is tes-
tifying will kill again.) 65 One thing Grigson is is certain; the 
other thing he is is persuasive. The jury sentenced Adams to 
death. 66 
Adams, who has long since been released from prison, has 
not killed again, or, for that matter, committed any crime at all. 
But if he had been executed, there would have been no way to 
say that Grigson was wrong. Indeed, one of the difficulties with 
disproving Grigson's claims is that he has been so effective a 
witness. Juries believed him and therefore sentenced everyone 
against whom he testified to death, making it difficult to estab-
lish that had the accused not been sentenced to death, no harm 
would have come about. 
When the Supreme Court set aside the Texas death penalty 
m 1972,67 however, one consequence was that many people 
64. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 37.071. 
65. Fuller~·. State, 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992) (en bane). 
66. Adams v. Stare, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Cr. App. 1979) (en bane). 
67. Branch v. Texas was the companion case from Texas when the Court held, in 
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against whom Grigson had testified had their death sentences 
transformed into life sentences, and many such inmates were 
subsequently paroled, providing a number of murderers each of 
whom, according to Grigson, would kill again if ever released. 
In the late 1980s, an assistant Dallas area district attorney in-
structed an investigator to track down the paroled murderers 
against whom Grigson had testified to see what had become of 
them. Most were living law-abiding lives; none had committed 
additional homicides, though one had committed a robbery; 
those that had never been released from prison were leading 
model inmate lives: following official orders and behaving peace-
fully. In other words, there is no empirical evidence of Grigson's 
predictions ever coming true, but substantial evidence of their 
not. 
People often wonder how it is possible for so many innocent 
men to be sent to prison at all, much less death row. Adams's 
case provides a typical answer: first, there is a murder that the 
police desperately want to solve. A man (in Adams's case, a 
boy, really) who himself risks a long term in prison sees an op-
portunity to trade a lie for freedom. An unemployed woman 
with a daughter facing prison sees an opportunity to cash in on 
reward money while also getting charges against her daughter 
dismissed. Police and prosecutors see an opportunity to prose-
cute someone who is eligible for the death penalty instead of a 
juvenile, who is not. A quack physician for pathological reasons 
of his own persuades an ingenuous group of jurors that a man 
with no history of violence is a disaster waiting to happen. And 
last of all, prosecutors stack the jury with people disposed to-
ward the death penalty. All these details of the death penalty 
regime are present in nearly all cases, but TBL does not empha-
size them because it instead focuses with relentless single-
mindedness on Adams's innocence. 
Almost everything that happened in the Adams trial, as of-
fensive to notions of justice as the trial may have been, was legal. 
Almost everything-but not quite. The state in a death penalty 
case is not permitted to stack the jury. In Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois,68 the Supreme Court held that a state could not remove for 
cause a potential juror just because that potential juror ex-
pressed moral qualms with the death penalty. Even such a juror, 
Furman v. Georgia, that the death penalty. as then applied, was unconstitutional. 408 
U.S. 238 (1972) 
68. 391 us s1o (!9oS). 
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the Court held, must be permitted to serve on the jury if he or 
she could swear an ability to obey the oath that jurors take to 
uphold and enforce the law, as instructed by the trial judge. Any 
other rule, the Court reasoned, would create a death-qualified 
jury, one predisposed toward death. 
A decade after Witherspoon, Texas prosecutors were still 
violating it. 69 In Adams's case, prosecutors, in accordance with a 
then-extant statute, excluded jurors who were unable to swear 
that the ~otential death sentence would not "affect" their delib-
erations. ° Following his defeat in the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals, Adams, through his lawyers, appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, arguing principally that this Texas 
practice violated the rule of Witherspoon by creating a jury pre-
disposed toward death. The Supreme Court, by a vote of eight 
to one, with only then-Justice Rehnquist dissenting, agreed. 71 
After twelve years on death row, Adams had his death sentence 
set aside. 
Following the Supreme Court's decision, Adams's lawyers 
went back to the state courts, to try to win his release. However, 
in the interim, Governor Bill Clements had commuted Adams's 
death sentence into a life sentence, so the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals determined that Adams should not be released from 
prison, because the only thing the Supreme Court had held was 
that the death sentence itself was unlawful; it had not set aside 
Adams's conviction. 72 Adams had won in the Supreme Court, 
but the State of Texas still refused to allow him to go free. 
In the meantime, David Harris had not reformed. This fact 
should not have been a surprise. He had served time in a mili-
tary stockade, as well as in correctional facilities in Texas and 
California. His lengthy criminal record included violent assault 
and armed robbery. At last he broke into a couple's home and 
attempted to abduct the girlfriend of Mark Mays. When Mays 
retrieved his own gun and tried to protect himself and his girl-
friend, Harris shot him to death. Harris was arrested, convicted 
of capital murder, and sentenced to death. 
Errol Morris did not begin filming The Thin Blue Line until 
Harris was on death row himself. In the final interview with 
Harris, Harris is asked "What do you think about whether or not 
69. Sec supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing Farris and Riley). 
70. Tex. Penal Code§ 12.31 (1973) (repealed). 
71. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). 
72. Adams~·. Stale, 624 S.W.2d 568 (1981) (en bane). 
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[Adams] is innocent?" "I'm sure he is," Harris answers. "How 
can you be sure?" asks the interviewer, and Harris replies, 
'"Cause I'm the one that knows." 
Finally, in the late 1980s, following the release of The Thin 
Blue Line, Adams's lawyers commenced state habeas corpus 
proceedings. The Court of Criminal Appeals eventually ordered 
a new trial. 73 Adams was ordered released from prison. The 
State of Texas elected not to retry him, and Adams was at last a 
free man. 
Dead Man Walking 
The title of the movie comes from the book of the same 
name, written by Helen Prejean, a nun who has ministered to 
death row inmates in Louisiana for more than ten years. 74 Al-
though Prejean's book is nonfiction, the murderous character in 
the movie, Matthew Poncelet, is not a particular person; he is in-
stead a composite of a number of different murderers, not all of 
whom are in Prejean's book.75 
At one level, the movie is, as it must have been, about Sister 
Helen Prejean. Prejean, played by Susan Sarandon, is a woman 
from an affluent Louisiana family who lives in the Saint Thomas 
projects, an inner city neighborhood where she stands out, even 
though she does not wear a habit, because she is white. The 
other women who work with her at the Hope House, where 
Helen teaches adults to read, warn her against her visit to death 
row; "they're all con men," she's told. Prejean opposes the 
death penalty not because Catholic doctrine requires such oppo-
sition, but because she believes that executions erode the dignity 
of the executioner. 
At another level the movie is about a murderer and his fam-
ily. In a brilliant performance, Sean Penn plays Matthew Ponce-
let, a hate-filled, recidivistic, thoroughly unappealing character. 
During his first meeting with Prejean, Poncelet chastises her for 
living in a neighborhood where "every nigger carr[ies] a gun." 
Later, after a night when two black men were executed, Poncelet 
73. Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989) (en bane). 
74. Prejean, Dead Man Walking (cited in note 2). 
75. In one striking indication that Robbins has done his homework, he has Poncelet 
order shrimp for his last meal, and Ponct.:let says that he wants them because he has 
never eaten them before. It is hard to imagine that anyone with teeth in Louisiana hasn't 
eaten shrimp, but Robbins got this detail from Fourteen Days in May. For his final meal, 
Edward Earl Johnson orders shrimp, telling Warden Cabana that he has never had them 
before. 
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says that he hopes prison officials clean the gurney before exe-
cuting him. 
Her colleagues worry that Prejean will be snookered-and I 
have seen more than a few sophisticated lawyers conned by 
murderers on death row- but Prejean is not. She is portrayed as 
a woman of wide-eyed realism. "I'm not sure I want to run into 
this guy on the street," she tells her housemates. Yet she also 
believes deeply in the power of reason, in the ability of human 
beings to educate one another, and in the power of education to 
eradicate much evil. Following one of Poncelet's racist tirades, 
for example, Prejean says to him, "Was your daddy a racist?" 
Poncelet stops his rant on a dime. Prejean engages him, gets him 
to express his admiration for Martin Luther King, Jr. Poncelet 
respected Reverend King, we learn, "because he wasn't lazy," 
and Prejean tells him that what he hates is laziness, not black 
people. 
This romantic notion that education and reason will over-
come prejudice and hate, that even the basest, least educated 
among us can be taught that we are all brothers and sisters, may 
be ingenuous, but then again, perhaps it is not. 76 For whatever 
other adjective one might use to characterize Prejean, she cannot 
fairly be called naive. One evening one of her housemates asks 
Prejean what has drawn her to the Poncelet case, and Prejean 
says, "I feel caught rather than drawn" -a characterization that 
contrasts starkly with Prejean's earlier recollection of being 
"drawn" to a life as a nun: one journey was attractive to her; the 
other was merely irresistible. What is more, this same dynamic 
aptly characterizes the career arcs of many death penalty law-
yers; it is not an attraction to murderers that leads them to this 
highly specialized area of practice where economic rewards are 
few and lawyers often become pariahs in their own neighbor-
hoods, but rather an inability to resist a calling.77 When judges 
and politicians accuse death penalty lawyers of preferring crimi-
nals to victims, in other words, they are not even close to the 
truth. The death penalty lawyers I know do what they do be-
cause, like Prejean, they are drawn; they feel irresistibly called 
upon to protect the rights of those who have neither allies nor 
76. The sanguine message is the same, for example, in American History X, where a 
skinhead goes to prison for murder and emerges years latcr a changed man. 
77. Sec, e.g., Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 353 (1996); James M. Doyle, The Lawyer's Art: "Representation" in 
Capital Cases, 8 Yale J.L. & Hum. 417 (1996). 
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resources, to safeguard rights of those who have no ability to 
fend for themselves. 
Of course, one consequence of representing murderers is 
that lawyers drawn to such a practice will often have clients who, 
if not themselves irredeemable, have nonetheless committed un-
forgivable deeds. So too with Poncelet. For much of the length 
of the movie, his most (and, in truth, only) redeeming quality is 
that he loves his family, and they him. It takes courage to show 
that even a vile character can love and be loved, but this film 
does that. Moreover, this aspect of the film is yet another meas-
ure of the film's honesty, for the truth is that Poncelet's relation-
ship with his family is common for an inmate on death row. One 
of the jarring sights one encounters when visiting death row is 
the sight of murderers' wives and children, mothers and aunts, 
who have come to visit. Also common is that the warm relation-
ship Poncelet has with his family does not extend to his father, 
who abandoned Poncelet's family many years before-though 
not before he had taken young Matthew into a bar when Mat-
thew was but twelve years old so as to teach him how to drink. It 
is true that most men on death row have either bad relationships 
or no relationships with their fathers; it is true that most men on 
death row grew up with no father at all or with one who was 
abusive. All this is true. But Poncelet does not blame his father 
for his crime, and Prejean's colleagues remind her that many 
kids without fathers do not become criminals. 
Again and again this film's message is that any platitude is 
false, and any easy answer is mistaken. This is the film's core 
quality: its subtle truthfulness. And it is in this respect more 
than any other that this film is different from most abolitionist 
arguments, and strikingly different from most death penalty ad-
vocacy. For most of the voices in the death penalty debate are 
shading the truth, usually intentionally. Most of the voices lie or 
cheat, because they believe that doing so furthers a desirable 
end. Nowhere is this shameful characteristic more prominent 
than in opinions of the Supreme Court. Thus, when the Su-
preme Court includes details of a murder in an opinion that 
deals, for example, with the question of whether a constitutional 
rule constitutes a "new rule" for purposes of determining its ret-
roactive application, 78 the recital of those details is entirely gra-
tuitous. The purpose played by such a recital is to provoke the 
78. Sec Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 51/l 
(1997). 
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reader's visceral outrage at the crime, and to make the reader 
entirely unsympathetic to the murderer-so unsympathetic that 
the reader does not care about the violation of a constitutional 
norm (if he or she even notices the violation). 
Just as it is dishonest of the Supreme Court to include 
graphic details of a crime that are not germane to the dispositive 
legal issue, it is similarly dishonest for death penalty opponents 
to ignore the horrific crimes that most residents of death row 
have committed. A death penalty proponent who believes that 
the death penalty is an ethical form of punishment must address 
the fact that innocents will be executed; a death penalty foe must 
address the fact that most residents of death row did what they 
were convicted of doing and their crimes evoke in many reason-
able people an impulse for vengeance that can be quieted only 
by an execution. When a death penalty opponent ignores the 
murderer's victims and the anguish of the victim's family and 
loved ones, the opponent is attempting to evade a fact that ought 
not- and cannot- be ignored. Facts are stubborn things for all 
the disputants, not just capital punishment supporters. 
Dead Men Walking confronts, rather then evades, these dis-
turbing facts. When they were killed, Hope Percy and her boy-
friend Walter de la Croix were high school seniors. One cool 
Louisiana evening, while Percy and de la Croix were necking in 
de la Croix's car, Matthew Poncelet and an older fellow named 
Vitello were getting drunk. The two of them drove into the for-
est and stumbled onto Percy and de la Croix. In turn they raped 
Percy, and as Vitello killed her by stabbing her seventeen times, 
Poncelet shot de la Croix with a rifle in the back of the head, 
killing him. The bodies of the two teenagers were not found un-
til six days later. Percy and de la Croix suffered terror and uni-
maginable physical pain, and the film presents it all. Poncelet's 
crime is a vicious one, and anyone who does not feel an urge for 
vengeance as the scenes of the crime are played over and over 
again is not, I think, emotionally sincere. 
Up until twenty minutes before his execution, Poncelet con-
tinues to deny having committed a murder. He will admit only 
to having been present. Here DMW has the chance to cheat. It 
can saddle Vitello with both murders. Poncelet would not be in-
nocent, in any cosmic sense, but neither would he be a mur-
derer. Yet the film does not take this out. As Ponce let uncon-
vincingly denies having pulled the trigger, DMW shows the rape-
murder scene over and over. The movie itself is in color, but the 
flash-backs to the crime are in grainy black-and-white, a tech-
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nique that has the effect of stripping everything down, whittling 
away all that is extraneous and irrelevant so that what we are left 
with is a terrifying, and terrifyingly simple, brutal act of sav-
agery. Hilton Barber, who agrees at Prejean's entreaty to handle 
Poncelet's appeal, says early on in the movie that "it's easy to 
kill a monster but ... hard to kill a human being" -a point so ir-
refragably true that the strategy of DMW is to make it not at all 
obvious which side of that line Poncelet falls on. 
The fundamental moral strategy of death penalty advocates 
is precisely to characterize murderers as less than human. In re-
cent years, the single execution in America that has been nation-
ally newsworthy was the execution of Karla Faye Tucker in 
Texas-not because her crime was less or more horrific than 
Matthew Poncelet's, for it was not, but simply because she had a 
handful of characteristics that forced even committed death pen-
alty proponents to confront her humanity. 79 At one point Ponce-
let, disgusted with the moral righteousness of Prejean, says to 
her, "Why should I respect you? Because you got that cross 
around your neck?" No, says Prejean, you should respect me 
"because I am a person." Prejean, who has spent hours with 
Poncelet, cannot help but see him as a person. Death penalty 
lawyers, who spend time with their clients and meet their clients' 
families, cannot help but see them as human beings, even as 
prosecutors and pandering politicians insist on saying that those 
on death row are animals. Yet every now and then, a murderer 
like Karla Faye Tucker pierces the pretense. The singular dif-
ference between Tucker and Poncelet is not that Poncelet is in-
human; it is that, unlike Tucker, he was not able to project his 
humanity to those who did not know him. 
The salient moral divide is the line we have constructed be-
tween persons and wild animals. In D MW we see Prejean forge 
a connection, a human connection, with Poncelet: a man who 
committed an animalistic act, a man who expresses admiration 
for Hitler and doubts that six million Jews were killed. Poncelet 
is not likable, and that is the point. Karla Faye Tucker found a 
sympathizer in Pat Robertson because she was likable. 80 Ponce-
let, like everyone, has some good qualities, but no aptitude for 
projecting them. Even in the very end, when he finally admits 
79. Sec Dow, The Humanity of Karla Faye Tucker, 90:3 Texas Observer (cited in 
note 5). 
. 80. ld. More recently, Robertson has endorsed the call for a death penalty morato-
num, because of the risk of executing an innocent. See supra note 5. 
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his guilt and is suffused with remorse, he is still not likable. So 
how does Prejean forge with him a human connection? What 
special power does she have that allows her to see him as a hu-
man being? Is this a skill given only to those possessed of reli-
gious faith-and therefore a skill that is as foreign to those of us 
without such faith as the ability to run a four-minute mile? Not 
according to Prejean. "It's not faith that heals hate," she says, 
"it's a lot of work." This is the lesson Tim Robbins has learned 
from Prejean's book, and the message that drives this film. 
DMW is, I think, an anti-death penalty film. It mocks the 
protestors who celebrate executions. It portrays the prison chap-
lain (a man who cites the Old Testament in support of the death 
penalty with not the slightest understanding of the Hebrew bi-
ble's nuanced and equivocal approach to this ultimate punish-
ment)81 as a buffoon. It derides the Governor who grotesquely 
uses executions as a political tool (as so many recent Presidents 
and presidential candidates have done). It portrays prison 
guards and the prison doctor and even the warden himself as 
men who avoid having qualms about what they are doing by 
avoiding giving any thought to what they are doing. "It's just 
part of the job, you know," the doctor says, a sentiment shared 
by the guard who straps execution victims to the gurney. These 
men- the doctor, the guards, even the warden himself- are 
surely not the moral equivalent of an Eichmann or a Calley, yet 
they are their distant moral cousins. These men in Angola do 
not kill as many, and those whom they do execute can hardly be 
portrayed as innocent. Yet they do act, and they consciously re-
fuse to confront the morality of their actions. It is precisely in 
such refusals that most all ordinary evil begins. 
DMW has a point of view, but it is a point of view that 
whispers rather than shouts. Except for the chaplain and the 
governor (easy targets), the film is respectful to every character 
and every point of view. Part of DMW's strategy, it seems, is to 
break down the simplistic dichotomies and hackneyed stereo-
types. Hope's father says to Prejean, "You can't befriend that 
murderer and expect to be our friend, too," and he is probably 
right about that because he has characterized Prejean as a 
"friend" of the murderer, and victims' families tend to see death 
penalty lawyers in exactly that light. But it is the wrong light. 
81 On this nuance and ambivalence, sec David R. Dow, The Dearh of Fairness 
Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Houston L. Rev. 1105, 
1114 (1994). 
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One does not need to like Poncelet- one need not be his 
friend-to think he should not be executed. That is why Ponce-
let is so thoroughly unlikable. He is not equivalent to Hope or 
Walter, who were young and innocent. The distinction between 
victim and murderer is not entirely artificial; it is not a social 
construct, and any death penalty movie that suggests that it is 
loses all credibility. Hope and Walter were young kids who had 
their entire lives before them, until Poncelet (and Vitello) mur-
dered them. 
In the movie's penultimate scene, Poncelet says in his final 
words that killing is wrong, regardless of whether the killer is 
Poncelet or the State of Louisiana,82 yet the faces of Hope and 
Walter, superimposed on the glass partition that separates Pon-
celet from the witnesses, remind us that although all killing may 
well be wrong, there are still degrees of evil. Their innocent vis-
ages do not dare let us equate their deaths with Poncelet's. As 
Poncelet takes his final breaths, scenes of the rape-murder min-
gle with scenes of the execution, and there is no question which 
is more violent, which is more horrific, which is more terrifying, 
which is worse. Killing is not killing. That truth is certain. But 
that truth does not entail that executions are just. 
III. CONCLUSION: SHOULD INNOCENCE MATTER? 
The Thin Blue Line and Fourteen Days in May are "real" in 
the sense that they are documentaries, telling stories that are 
nonfiction. They are real in the sense that states do send inno-
cent men to death row, states do execute innocent men, and 
these documentaries show us some. The documentaries are real 
in the sense that their characters are not actors. And yet, in 
many respects, the Hollywood movies are more real- more real 
because they show us more, more real because they show us 
guilty men. Like Dead Men Walking's Matthew Poncelet and 
The Green Mile's Wild Bill, most men on death row did the act 
that they are sent to death row for having done, and like Ponce-
82. In the movie's execution scene, DMW docs cheat just a little: when Poncclet 
addresses the witnesses with his final statement, he is already strapped to the gurney, 
which IS how it actually happens. but in the movie the guards swivel the gurney so that 
Poncelet is upright. With his arms strapped to the gurney at 90 degree angles to his 
torso, he looks like Jesus on the cross. That isn't how it's done in Louisiana, and the the-
atricality is a hit of cheating, yet it is forgivable because even as the lethal drug cocktail is 
being administered, the faces of Poncclet's murder victims arc reflected in the execution 
chamber glass. 
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let, many death row inmates deny their guilt for many years, be-
fore seeking redemption in confession. 
The Hollywood movies are more real because, unlike the 
lawyers who represented Randall Dale Adams and unlike the 
habeas lawyers who represented Edward Johnson, the trial law-
yers who represented the killers in Dead Man Walking and The 
Green Mile were dismal: Poncelet's lead counsel was a tax law-
yer who had never before tried a capital case; he spent four 
hours on jury selection-a process that, if done well, takes 
weeks, if not months. In a trial that lasted five days, this lawyer 
raised a single objection. Coffey's lawyer was just going through 
the motions, infected with the same insidious attitude toward 
black men that skewed the vision of so many southerners in the 
1930s (and, sadly, today). 
The Hollywood films are more real than the documentaries 
because, if one wants to address the morality of the death pen-
alty, then one must acknowledge that, while cases like Adams's 
are chilling, they are far from typical. Ninety-nine percent of the 
people on death row did what they have been convicted of. Per-
haps the prospect of a one-percent error rate will cause some to 
conclude that the death penalty ought to be abolished. That fact 
alone, however, will not change most minds. If the objective is 
to think about the morality of capital punishment per se, then it 
is a distraction to choose a subject who is innocent. Dead Man 
Walking eschews that distraction entirely; its subject is a particu-
lar and detestable guilty man who committed a particularly grisly 
murder. The Green Mile includes an innocent man, but not at 
the expense of overshadowing all the rest. 
In contrast, The Thin Blue Line and Fourteen Days in May, 
though exceedingly powerful films, have nothing to do with the 
philosophical issue of the death penalty's moral legitimacy. To a 
committed death penalty advocate, executing an occasional in-
nocent man is simply the cost of doing business. The focus on 
innocence is even worse than a distraction because it tends to le-
gitimate the increasingly entrenched legal doctrine that holds 
that unless an inmate can prove that he did not actually commit 
the crime for which he was sentenced, then virtually any consti-
tutional violation can be overlooked. 83 Surely innocence should 
matter but it should not be all that matters. Constitutional val-, 
83. Calderon v. Coleman. 525 U.S. 141 (1998). 
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ues and moral norms are not applicable only to the wrongly ac-
cused. 
Dead Man Walking and The Green Mile tackle the moral is-
sues frontally and without the distraction of innocence. Death 
penalty advocates commonly offer three justifications for capital 
punishment, and these films speaks to each of them. The first 
justification is the so-called general deterrence rationale. The 
idea of general deterrence is that when the state executes a con-
victed murderer, it sends the message to others thinking about 
murder and discourages them from killing. Bank robbers, for 
example, will load their guns with blanks instead of live ammuni-
tion so that when they brandish them during the course of a rob-
bery no one will inadvertently get shot. But of course, it does 
not take studies to prove that bank robbers rob because they 
think they will not get caught. That is why bank robbers in 
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi still use bullets even though 
these states show no hesitation in implementing the death pen-
alty. (In Texas, the State carries out more than three executions 
a month.) Matthew Poncelet and Wild Bill committed rape and 
murder even though Louisiana has a death penalty and uses it. 84 
The second reason cited in support of the death penalty is 
specific deterrence. The idea of specific deterrence is that even 
if executing a criminal does not send a message to murderers in 
general that they had better not kill, it does send a message to a 
particular murderer, i.e., the one who is executed. That mur-
derer, at least, will never kill again. The specific deterrence ra-
tionale is compelling in a statistical sense, because it is true one 
hundred percent of the time that executed murderers never 
murder again. Matthew Poncelet and Wild Bill have killed their 
final victims. But Poncelet, as well as all of the murderers shown 
in TGM, were not murderous while in prison. These inmates 
could have been stopped from killing again by keeping them at 
Angola for the rest of their lives. 85 And in truth, even had any of 
84. Moreover, executions occur so regularlv in America that they are not newswor-
thy. In Texas, where more than 230 men and one woman have been. put to death since 
the death penalty resumed in 19il2, implementation of the death penalty is so common-
so mundane- that the State "s largest newspapers no longer even send reporters to death 
row when executions arc scheduled. If no one pays attention to the implementation of 
the penalty, it is impossible for anyone to be deterred by it. 
85. Of course, most states do not provide JUries in capital cases with the option of 
true life without parole -an issue beyond the scope of DMW and TGM. Still it is note-
worthy that although 75 percent of the public expresses support for capital punishment, 
this figure drops significantly, by some 15 percent or more, when life without parole is 
offered as an alternative punishment. This very fact goes a long way toward explaining 
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these murderers ever been released on parole, it is by no means 
clear that any would have tended to kill again, for there are no 
reliable data indicating that murderers are likely to murder again 
if they ever do get released from prison. On the contrary, of 
more than a dozen death row inmates in Texas whose convic-
tions were set aside on legal grounds and who were therefore re-
leased from prison, not a single one had committed another 
murder in the following decade.86 
The final justification for the death penalty can be charac-
terized as religious or retributive in nature: an eye for an eye. 
The irony here is well-known: the moral premise of the retribu-
tive rationale is that it is wrong to murder, that it is immoral to 
kill. So how can one who holds this view sanction a punishment 
whereby the state kills? This is the question that tortures Walter 
de la Croix's father, who cannot resist visiting Poncelet's grave.87 
Despite our norm condemning homicide, still we say that killing 
is permitted in self defense,88 but how does the killing of Ponce-
let implicate this exception? Homicide is an act that is inher-
ently wrong, and this inherent wrongness does not evanesce 
when the homicide is carried out by the state. 
Among all of humanity, there is perhaps no stronger or 
more universal norm than the proposition that killing is wrong. 
The Thin Blue Line and, to a slightly lesser extent, Fourteen 
Days in May, hold up an innocent man and say, "The death pen-
alty may be acceptable in theory, but what about the wrongly 
convicted?'' And in so doing, these two films manage to avoid 
the issue of the death penalty altogether. Dead Man Walking 
and, to a lesser extent, The Green Mile, hold up guilty men and 
say that all this talk of innocence is a moral distraction. Death 
row is full of guilty men, but they are yet men: human beings 
who committed vile and despicable acts, yet still human beings. 
why prosecutors and other proponents of the death penalty routinely struggle to defeat 
legislative measures that would permit juries to sentence murderers to life without pa-
role: they know that if jurors could sentence murderers to a real life term, they would be 
far less likclv to sentence them to death. 
86. This remarkable statistic is all the more noteworthy because a psychiatrist 
called as a witness by the State testified at the trial of every one of these men that that he 
was 100 percent certain that each would, if released, kill again. This psychiatrist, James 
Grigson, is discussed above, in the section of this essay that addresses TBL. 
87. I represented a man on death row who murdered a woman whose son, prior to 
the murder of his mother, had been an active opponent of capital punishment. I do not 
know whether the murder of his mother changcd his mind. I do know that he attended 
every hearing and appellate argument, of whatever length, during the years of the appeaL 
88. The deterrence rationale for the death penalty ts a htghly attenuated mstance ot 
this exception. 
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We in society have the legal power to kill these men when we act 
through the fiction of the state, but we cannot elude moral re-
straints by funneling our actions through that fiction. If it is 
wrong for the men (and women) on death row to have killed, it 
is wrong for us to kill; if it is wrong for us to kill, it is wrong for 
us to have the state kill on our behalves. That simple syllogism is 
the essence of the moral objection to the death penalty. It is that 
objection that death penalty documentaries, for all their great-
ness, entirely avoid; and it is that objection that the Hollywood 
movies compel us to face. 
